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ABSTRACT
Right now Malaysia has the major economic fundamentals more or less right 
(excepting the budget deficit). The inflation rate is low (1.2%), unemployment 
rate is relatively low (3.5%), current account balance is significantly positive 
(13.7%), foreign reserves are growing and comfortable and the savings rate 
is high. Given Malaysia’s current economic and political strength and the 
experiences of many other open economies, it appears to me that as long as 
the macroeconomic discipline as well as the ongoing financial and corporate 
sector restructuring developments are maintained, Malaysia can enhance 
its FDI inflows, growth rate of output and employment significantly by 
continuing with the current independent monetary policy but shifting towards 
a managed peg linked to a basket of currencies weighted by trade balance 
along with an accelerated removal of capital controls. The regime change 
will send a powerful positive signal to the outside world about Malaysia’s 
own confidence in its future prospects.
ABSTRAK
Kini Malaysia sudah mempunyai asas ekonomi yang selesa (kecuali defisit 
dalam bajet). Kadar inflasi rendah (1.2%), kadar penggangguran yang secara 
relatif, juga rendah, imbangan akaun semasa yang amat positif (13.7%), rizab 
asing meningkat dan selesa serta kadar simpanan juga tinggi. Berdasarkan 
kekuatan ekonomi dan politik semasa dan pengalaman ekonomi negara-
negara lain, pada hemat saya, selagi disiplin makroekonomi dipertahankan 
dan penstrukturan kewangan sektor korporat diteruskan, Malaysia mampu 
meningkatkan kemasukan pelaburan langsung asing, kadar pertumbuhan 
output dan pekerjaan secara signifikan menggunakan polisi kewangan bebas 
yang sedia ada tetapi secara beransur-ansur beralih kepada menyandarkan 
secara terurus terhadap sekumpulan matawang asing disamping melonggarkan 
kawalan modal. Perubahan regim ini akan memberikan petunjuk yang kuat 
dan positif kepada dunia tentang keyakinan Malaysia sendiri terhadap 
prospeknya pada masa hadapan.
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INTRODUCTION
The policy makers in open economies are faced with the choice in terms 
of classic macroeconomic trilemma (i.e., to achieve simultaneously three 
‘inconsistent’ policy goals: an independent monetary policy, free capital 
movement, and a fixed exchange rate). Only two out of the three above goals 
can be mutually consistent at a particular regime and the third goal has to 
be sacrificed.  Which policy option should Malaysia go for? 
 This paper casts the choices faced by the policy makers in terms of 
the classic macroeconomic trilemma: the idea that the above three policy 
objectives are not compatible. The intuition is simple: when a country pegs 
to some base currency and when capital is fully mobile, simple interest rate 
parity pins down the domestic interest rate, forcing it to be equal to the 
interest rate of the base currency.
 If monetary activism is taken to mean the ability to drive local interest 
rates away from the global rate, then arbitrage in open capital markets and 
simple interest parity under a credible fixed exchange rate clearly defeats 
the objective. Despite the clarity and simplicity of this prediction, one is 
surprised by the frequency with which the lessons of the trilemma seem to 
be disregarded by policy makers, even today. This might reflect the lack 
of empirical studies showing how tight the constraints really are (Obstfeld, 
Shambaugh & Taylor 2004a).
 The trilemma finds considerable empirical support in this era. The trilemma 
was a constraint on policy for countries that fixed their exchange rate and 
maintained open capital markets. They lost much of their monetary autonomy 
compared with countries that adopted alternative regimes. Empirically, there 
is strong evidence in support of the trilemma that emerges in the data as a 
long enduring and still very relevant constraint on the political equilibrium 
(Obstfeld et al. 2004b). 
 Historically, the classical gold standard was a highly globalized period 
of mostly fixed rates, free capital mobility, and hence limited monetary 
independence.  The architecture of the post World War II Bretton Woods 
System provided monetary autonomy with relatively stable, fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates requiring strict limits on capital mobility.
EXPERIENCES OF OPEN ECONOMIES IN  
DIFFERENT CONTINENTS
EXPERIENCE OF MEXICO AND ARGENTINA
Mexico’s Crawling Peg (up to December 1994). Less than 12 months after 
NAFTA, Mexico faced economic disaster in December 1994 when she devalued 
the peso. The main fly in the ointment was Mexico’s current account deficit 
that went up from $6 billion in 1989 to $20 billion in 1992/93.
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 Mexico had a crawling peg system with the dollar. However, in real 
(price adjusted) terms, the peso was appreciating, contributing to the growing 
current account deficit. Mexico’s inflation rate was higher than the sum of 
the US inflation rate and peso depreciation, so the real exchange rate was 
rising which led to the growing current account deficit and capital flight, and 
the loss of reserves. This eventually resulted in devaluation and the crisis 
was made worse by an on-going political crisis (Whitt 1996).
Argentina’s Fixed Exchange Rate Currency Board (April 1991 to January 
2002). Argentina’s currency board was not an orthodox currency board. 
The character of their currency board allowed it to be partially backed by 
domestic rather than hard foreign currency assets. The central bank was 
initially permitted to hold as little as 66.6% of its assets in true foreign 
reserves (which was raised to 90%). The gap could be held in the form 
of Argentinean government bonds. Hence the charter of its currency board 
opened the door of discretionary monetary policy.  
The Lessons. The exchange rate, regardless of its nature, is not a cure for 
improper macroeconomic policies.  Argentina’s public debt at the time of its 
devaluation in 2002 exceeded $155 billion. Argentina had an unsustainable 
budget deficit (since export revenues went down due to an overvaluation 
of its currency vis-à-vis its major trading partners such as Brazil) (Spiegel 
2002).
EXPERIENCE OF SOUTH AFRICA
With the beginning of the end of the dual financial (rand) exchange rate 
system in March 1995, South Africa made its first clear move towards a freer 
exchange rate arrangement. This was accompanied by lifting various capital 
account restrictions, but by then, the aftermath of Mexico’s peso crisis was 
already a fresh but painful memory. 
 The authorities have since employed a gradual approach to promote 
capital mobility through severing controls and restrictions on flows, all this 
taking place when the global pace of liberalization has slowed following 
the succession of currency and financial crises throughout global emerging 
markets, as well as South Africa’s own escalated periods of volatility notably 
in 1998 and 2001.
 Despite debate on the appropriate pace of liberalization, South Africa 
has achieved many of the preconditions for complete removal of controls 
(Teixeira, Masih & O’Neill 2004), not in the least a clear and transparent 
monetary policy framework with a staunch and so far credible inflation 
targeting regime. Accompanied with a strong financial regulatory environment, 
and efficient fiscal management, inflation targeting in South Africa has already 
helped her reserve bank to moderate inflationary expectations, lower interest 
rates, and dampen currency as well as fundamental volatility. The continued 
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stability and easing of financial restrictions has also helped the reserve bank 
to build up its gross international reserves position, leading to further currency 
strength and stability.
EXPERIENCE OF SAUDI ARABIA
Saudi Arabia kept its currency (Saudi Riyal) fixed with US$ since 1985. The 
main reason behind the fixed exchange rate was to keep the price of its major 
exports crude petroleum and petrochemicals fixed in US$. Saudi Arabia allows 
free movement of currency and capital but in line with resolving the trilemma 
has sacrificed monetary independence. The major role of Saudi monetary 
policy is to keep riyal pegged with the US$ by stabilizing the interest rate 
and inflation rate differentials between Saudi Arabia and USA.
EXPERIENCE OF HONG KONG AND CHINA
Hong Kong maintains a fixed exchange rate regime in the form of a currency 
board system foregoing monetary policy autonomy. The regime has enabled 
it to maintain a fixed exchange rate system and a fully integrated financial 
system. The experience of Hong Kong during the Asian crisis tends to suggest 
that only strong economies which have sufficiently large reserves and healthy 
financial system and which are following strict monetary and fiscal discipline 
are likely to withstand an interest rate pain resulting from speculative attack 
on their currencies. It appears that in Asia excluding Japan, only Taiwan and 
Singapore can qualify for that system. China maintains a fixed exchange rate 
with US$ by keeping capital controls on. It does, however, have a relatively 
weak financial system
EXPERIENCE OF AUSTRALIA
The flexible band (2 to 3%) and the medium term of inflation targeting had 
helped Australia stabilize both inflation and output variation. Australia’s 
inflation targeting does take output stabilization into account. The targeting 
has sufficient flexibility to allow for a short run trade off between output and 
inflation. A medium term price stability was maintained while still allowing 
for some degree of short run inflation variability – this providing scope for 
lower output variability.  
 Through the choice of its policy instrument (the real interest rate), the 
Reserve Bank of Australia minimizes the loss function that is defined as 
the weighted sum of inflation and output deviations from their target levels. 
Australia’s monetary policy is adjusted in response to deviations of inflation 
from its target and also deviations of output from its potential level. Such 
a reaction function for a monetary policy is often referred to as a ‘Taylor 
rule’. 
Too flexible inflation rate regimes may undermine public confidence.  And too 
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rigid an inflation rate regime may result in an unnecessarily large amount of 
output variability.  However, in deciding the appropriate degree of flexibility, 
consideration must be given first to establishing credibility in order to allow 
flexibility in the longer run (Debelle 1999).
EXPERIENCE OF EUROPEAN MONETARY SYSTEM
An alternative regime for solving the trilemma is to go for a single currency 
and give up exchange rate flexibility entirely. This is what the European 
monetary system has done. The emergence of ‘Euro’ is a major development 
in international finance during the recent decade. There are suggestions for 
a major currency in the Asian region. However, a number of studies tend to 
indicate that the Asian countries are still far from satisfying the criteria for 
establishing an optimum currency area. At the moment the levels of economic 
development and political systems are much more diverse in Asian countries 
than those among the European monetary system. Economic integration even 
among ASEAN countries is still very shallow. Hence it is not clear whether 
the Asian countries will get net benefits from joining the single currency area 
sacrificing monetary policy independence. Also there is as yet no political 
consensus to move in that direction. Despite all these limitations, the Asian 
countries should not completely dismiss the feasibility of establishing such 
a regime in the long term. We should bear in mind that it took European 
countries about 40 years of economic cooperation and integration before 
arriving at the single currency system. If the Asian countries can succeed in 
forming a currency union in about 20 years or so, then the world will move 
towards three major currencies: the US$, the Euro, and the Asian currency 
(Lamberte 2002).
MALAYSIAN CONTEXT AND POLICY ISSUES
SHOULD MALAYSIA CONTINUE ITS INDEPENDENT (RATHER  
THAN DEPENDENT) MONETARY POLICY?
This issue is related to the proposition as to whether ‘neutrality of money’ 
holds or not in the context of Malaysia. The issue finally boils down to 
whether money leads or lags economic activity in Malaysia.
 The causal relationship between money and other macroeconomic 
variables such as output, interest rate, prices, and exchange rate has been in 
dispute for a long time in mainstream macroeconomics. Different schools 
of thought have postulated the relationship in different ways, giving rise to 
different macroeconomic paradigms, such as the Classical, the Keynesian, the 
Monetarist, the New Classical, the New Keynesian, and finally, the recent 
Real Business Cycle. Up until the recent Real Business Cycle theory, the 
dominant common theme running across these doctrines (with the exception 
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of the Classical, who believed that an increase in money supply would in the 
long run result only in a proportionate increase in the price level without any 
increase in economic activity, P←M) was that an aggregate demand shock such 
as monetary shocks would have a positive effect on real economic activity. 
In other words, money would lead (rather than lag) economic activity. 
 The issues among the Keynesian, the Monetarist, the New Classical, 
and the New Keynesian were not whether or not monetary shocks had a 
positive effect on output but the nature and the transmission channels of these 
positive shocks. The Keynesian believed that a positive monetary shock would 
increase both economic activity and price level through the interest rate and 
investment variables (Y←P←I←R←M). Led by Friedman, the Monetarist 
integrated the Keynesian short-run theory with the Classical long-run theory. 
In the short run, they agreed with the Keynesian transmission channel (Y←
M), but if the monetary expansion is sustained in the long run, they agreed 
with the Classical as to the long-run neutrality of money (P←R←Y←M), 
because monetary expansion would then be dissipated in terms of higher 
interest rates and prices rather than output, which would return to “natural 
level” as soon as the inflationary expectations have been fully adapted. The 
expectation-augmented long-run supply curve, according to them, will be 
fully vertical, although in the short run it could be upward-sloping, as is 
postulated by the Keynesian. 
 The New Classical, led by Barro, Lucas, Sargent, and Wallace, 
decomposed monetary effect into output and price effect, not on the basis of 
short and long run but on whether the monetary expansion is “anticipated” 
or “unanticipated”. Based on the concept of “rational expectations” and 
equilibrium “efficient market” hypothesis, they postulated that only the 
unanticipated monetary expansion would result in an increase in output, but 
the anticipated increase in money would be dissipated in inflation; that is, 
according to them, the expectation-augmented supply curve is vertical both 
in the short as well as in the long term. 
 The New Keynesian, however, based on the hypotheses of rational 
expectations but disequilibrium inefficient market, postulated non-neutrality 
of money at least in the short run because of rigidities in prices and wages, 
and market failures and imperfections. In sharp contrast to these competing 
paradigms, the recent Real Business Cycle (RBC) theory is the latest incarnation 
of the “classical dichotomy” in that monetary expansion cannot increase real 
output. The RBC economists view the historical association between money 
and output as the case of money supply endogenously responding (rather 
than leading) to an increase in output. To the RBC school, money-output 
correlations observed in the data should be attributed to “reverse causation”. 
That is, the banking sector responds to increased demand for transactions by 
creating more inside money. To them, monetary expansion, whether short or 
long run (as focused by the Monetarist) and anticipated or unanticipated (as 
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focused by the early New Classical school), will have no positive effect on 
output; it will only raise interest rates and the price level. The RBC school, 
therefore, views money supply as endogenous and a function of output 
that is determined exogenously by factors such as technology or other real 
“stochastic” shocks (P←R←M←Y).
 We tested empirically the above macroeconomic paradigms through 
the application of recent dynamic time-series econometric techniques in the 
context of Malaysia (Tables 1 and 2, Figures 1a and 2a), Thailand (Tables 
3 and 4, Figures 1B and 2B) and Indonesia (see Tables 5 and 6, Figures 3 
and 4) with a view to discerning the lead-lag controversy between money 
and output (Masih and Masih 1996a; 1996b). 
 The results based on variance decompositions and impulse response 
functions in the case of Malaysia and Thailand tend to indicate that money 
supply (particularly M1) more often predominantly leads (rather than lags) 
output and the other three nominal variables (interest rate, prices and exchange 
rates). 
 These findings are consistent more with the Monetarist (in the case of 
Malaysia) and the Keynesian (in the case of Thailand). In other words, money 
supply is found to be most exogenous in the Granger-causal chain and hence 
an increase in money supply does increase output and employment at least in 
the short run. However, in the case of Indonesia, the results tend to indicate 
that output more often predominantly leads (rather than lags) money supply 
and the other three nominal variables and the findings are consistent more 
with the recent real business cycle theory than with the other two major 
macroeconomic paradigms such as the Keynesian and the Monetarist. 
 These findings have clear policy implications in the sense that as long as 
there is stability and continuation of economic policies (regardless of change 
of governments) within the framework of proper macroeconomic discipline 
(implying thereby an expectation-augmented supply curve being not completely 
vertical), a monetary expansion in Malaysia (and Thailand) will not necessarily 
be dissipated merely in terms of higher nominal variables (such as prices, 
exchange rates, or interest rates) but will contribute positively to an increase 
in output and employment as happened in both Malaysia and Thailand during 
the major part of the period under review (unlike Indonesia in which an 
excessive monetary expansion was dissipated in terms of relatively higher 
nominal variables such as prices, exchange rates or interest rates rather than 
real output in view of relative lack of proper macroeconomic discipline).
 The above empirical results based on rigorous dynamic time series 
techniques tend to suggest that Malaysia may continue its long standing 
independent monetary policy.
SHOULD MALAYSIA CONTINUE (OR LIFT FULLY) CAPITAL CONTROLS?
Given the independence of monetary policy in Malaysia, the imposition 
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TABLE 1. Decomposition of Variance for M1 Model (Malaysia) 
 Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 58.80 24.32 9.61 2.77 4.50
3 53.34 25.66 11.89 4.18 4.93
4 49.18 25.08 12.00 8.50 5.24
5 36.49 39.00 15.01 5.99 3.52
10 36.66 38.65 14.20 6.45 4.03
Relative Variance in: ΔM1
1 27.38 72.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 16.99 75.74 6.44 0.81 0.02
3 25.56 60.09 11.07 1.36 1.93
4 24.77 58.25 11.26 2.98 2.73
5 23.41 60.10 10.91 2.81 2.76
10 23.98 59.18 10.86 2.77 3.20
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.66 2.90 96.44 0.00 0.00
2 9.20 45.00 42.79 0.00            3.01
3 12.82 43.04 41.29 0.14 2.70
4 22.46 36.76 37.97 0.11 2.70
5 20.53 40.77 35.70 0.68 2.34
10 20.60 42.62 32.18 0.87 3.72
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 0.47 8.87 14.69 75.95 0.00
2 3.82 30.52 31.89 33.75 0.02
3 10.55 45.86 23.70 19.83 0.05
4 13.12 46.11 21.74 18.99 0.05
5 12.96 45.87 21.51 19.23 0.44
10 13.07 46.45 21.21 18.73 0.55
Relative Variance in: ΔER
1 2.45 11.67 45.64 0.05 40.18
2 2.36 31.36 39.46 0.63 26.20
3 7.64 34.72 36.67 0.81 20.16
4 7.83 34.44 36.38 1.41 19.94
5 8.27 34.18 36.03 1.45 20.07
10 8.75 35.13 35.13 1.51 19.49
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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TABLE 2. Decomposition of Variance for M2 Model (Malaysia)
 Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 75.99 0.50 11.49 12.01 0.00
3 75.56 0.70 11.71 11.95 0.07
4 75.52 0.73 11.73 11.94 0.07
5 75.47 0.74 11.74 11.96 0.08
10 75.47 0.74 11.74 11.96 0.08
Relative Variance in: ΔM2
1 8.07 91.93 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 7.01 78.71 0.05 5.67 8.56
3 8.63 76.62  0.84 5.61 8.30
4 8.51 75.68 1.09 6.24 8.48
5 8.56 75.52 1.09 6.34 8.48
10 8.56 75.48 1.10 6.37 8.49
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.62 0.69 98.69 0.00 0.00
2 7.52 11.31 77.34 1.80 2.03
3 7.84 10.79 74.24 4.64 2.48
4 7.87 11.34 73.50 4.73 2.55
5 7.88 11.33 73.37 4.82 2.60
10 7.89 10.35 73.33 4.83 2.60
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 1.39 0.05 7.44 91.12 0.00
2 8.97 14.12 5.88 68.97 2.06
3 10.02 13.45 5.96 68.07 2.50
4 9.97 14.00 6.03 67.38 2.61
5 9.99 13.97 6.02 67.36 2.64
10 9.99 14.00 6.03 67.32 2.65
Relative Variance in: ΔER
1 1.80 12.92 5.51 14.20 65.56
2 3.79 25.02 4.32 16.29 50.58
3 3.43 26.72 3.90 17.94 48.00
4 4.20 26.81 3.88 17.84 47.28
5 4.18 26.90 3.94 17.98 47.00
10 4.20 26.89 3.94 18.00 46.96
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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FIGURE 1. Impulse responses of real output, prices, exchange rate and 
interest rate from a one-standard shock to money (M1) in 
(a) Malaysia and (b) Thailand
FIGURE 2. Impulse responses of real output, prices, exchange rate and 
interest rate from a one-standard shock to money (M2) in 
(a) Malaysia and (b) Thailand
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
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TABLE 3. Decomposition of Variance for M1 Model (Thailand)
Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 86.34 1.13 1.45 11.08 0.00
3 60.09 16.42 12.56 10.76 0.16
4 59.46 16.80 12.87 10.56 0.31
5 59.81 16.65 12.72 10.44 0.37
10 59.00 16.75 13.40 10.38 0.46
Relative Variance in: ΔM1
1 0.15 99.85 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 3.64 93.04 1.58 0.02 1.54
3 3.78 88.47 4.09 0.20 3.45
4 3.70 88.27 4.21 0.38 3.42
5 4.06 83.45 7.05 0.95 4.48
10 4.21 80.15 8.41 2.33 4.90
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.07 5.90 33.84 60.18 0.00
2 0.65 33.40 22.35 39.41 1.34
3 0.82 42.26 19.24 34.03 3.06
4 1.12 39.31 20.54 33.36 3.34
5 1.10 38.68 20.19 34.41 3.75
10 1.46 36.64 21.87 33.70 4.25
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 0.07 5.90 33.84 60.18 0.00
2 0.65 33.40 22.35 39.41 4.19
3 0.82 42.26 19.24 34.03 3.65
4 1.12 39.31 20.54 33.36 5.66
5 1.10 38.68 20.19 34.41 5.61
10 1.46 36.64 21.87 33.70 6.33
Relative Variance in: ΔER
1 6.01 1.90 3.58 14.86 73.64
2 2.69 1.54 39.68 12.46 43.64
3 3.67 2.79 42.37 11.16 40.01
4 4.60 3.09 42.84 12.89 36.57
5 4.49 3.20 41.29 15.59 35.42
10 4.78 3.24 41.95 16.29 33.74
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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TABLE 4. Decomposition of Variance for M2 Model (Thailand)
Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 90.55 0.01 0.85 0.01 8.59
3 80.65 3.10 6.05 1.62 8.58
4 67.46 3.62 7.02 4.10 17.81
5 66.66 3.81 6.97 4.86 17.70
10 64.54 3.83 7.88 4.82 18.93
Relative Variance in: ΔM2
1 0.62 99.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.62 80.65 16.15 1.59 0.98
3 4.37 73.10 19.95 1.46 1.12
4 4.66 70.90 20.13 2.61 1.69
5 4.56 69.63 19.81 4.03 1.97
10 4.99 68.06 20.66 4.15 2.15
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.06 14.70 85.24 0.00 0.00
2 10.38 12.01 77.46 0.02            0.12
3 11.88 11.49 73.13 2.69 0.80
4 11.00 11.28 68.36 6.88 2.49
5 11.41 11.05 67.96 7.16 2.42
10 11.60 10.85 67.59 7.20 2.75
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 1.18 0.41 31.20 67.21 0.00
2 5.61 0.32 27.90 66.15 0.01
3 8.33 0.60 38.66 49.48 2.95
4 8.02 0.57 38.49 48.02 4.90
5 9.48 0.80 39.30 45.70 4.72
10 10.13 0.86 39.55 42.77 4.68
Relative Variance in: ΔER
1 1.06 0.13 0.31 29.70 40.18
2 1.22  3.11 5.88 26.84 26.20
3 3.85 3.45 10.65 25.55 20.16
4 3.89 3.70 10.64 25.45 19.94
5 3.90 3.94 10.57 25.62 20.07
10 4.11 3.95 11.01 25.45 19.49
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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TABLE 5. Decomposition of Variance for M1 Model (Indonesia)
Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 85.36 0.01 8.37 1.22 5.03
3 83.33 0.43 9.19 1.83 5.22
4 82.51 0.41 8.53 1.71 6.84
5 83.14 0.38 8.04 1.60 6.83
10 82.53 0.40 8.68 1.47 6.92
Relative Variance in: ΔM1
1 34.26 65.74 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 40.97 38.99 17.70 2.19 0.13
3 47.05 29.94  17.57 2.02 3.41
4 56.19 21.66 14.64 1.58 5.93
5 62.04 17.75 13.17 1.26 6.38
10 69.31 10.15 12.54 0.80 7.19
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.67 5.99 93.34 0.00 0.00
2 43.99 3.03 35.91 0.31 16.77
3 65.80 1.48 18.58 0.26 13.88
4 70.53 1.15 16.38 0.28 11.66
5 71.29 1.08 16.49 0.27 10.88
10 74.74 0.82 14.18 0.20 10.05
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 18.39 0.04 3.94 77.64 0.00
2 15.09 0.11 10.10 73.54 1.16
3 15.03 0.47 9.33 73.21 1.96
4 16.72 0.47 9.16 71.35 2.30
5 18.83 0.47 8.94 69.36 2.41
10 22.46 0.47 9.25 65.05 2.76
Relative Variance in: ΔER
1 0.29 36.80 2.13 0.41 60.36
2 35.22 17.47 12.50 0.63 34.18
3 34.33 16.92 11.96 2.13 34.65
4 37.75 15.51 11.31 2.06 33.36
5 39.06 15.19 11.09 2.03 32.64
10 39.46 14.93 11.33 2.02 32.27
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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TABLE 6. Decomposition of Variance for M2 Model (Indonesia)
Percentage of forecast variance explained by innovations in:
Years ΔY ΔM1 ΔIR ΔCP ΔER
Relative Variance in: ΔY
1 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 84.26 0.59 9.96 0.61 4.59
3 80.26 1.77 11.79 0.84 5.55
4 77.49 1.86 10.74 0.89 9.02
5 77.54 1.81 10.11 0.85 9.70
10 77.55 1.80 10.09 0.87 9.70
Relative Variance in: ΔM2
1 15.03 84.97 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 18.20 74.20 6.60 0.99 0.01
3 18.76 71.33 7.68 1.14 1.10
4 21.94 65.92 7.39 1.22 3.54
5 24.37 63.08 7.07 1.17 4.31
10 25.20 62.11 7.08 7.08 4.43
Relative Variance in: ΔIR
1 0.08 11.85 88.07 0.00 0.00
2 25.60 8.72 40.30 0.00 25.38
3 43.18 5.85 24.42 0.30 26.25
4 47.47 5.28 22.04 0.36 24.85
5 47.87 5.21 21.98 0.38 24.56
10 48.12 5.17 21.83 0.38 24.50
Relative Variance in: ΔCP
1 20.31 8.76 9.40 61.53 0.00
2 16.60 9.49 14.77 58.38 0.75
3 16.44 10.67 13.71 57.79 1.39
4 16.44 10.51 13.66 57.63 1.77
5 17.10 10.48 13.51 57.00 1.90
10 17.11 10.49 13.53 56.96 1.91
Relative Variance in: DER
1 0.14 38.63 1.45 2.12 57.64
2 16.90 22.57 17.50 1.67 41.36
3 16.02 22.51 17.14 2.16 42.14
4 22.15 19.58 14.77 2.19 41.32
5 24.99 18.71 14.16 2.10 40.04
10 25.15 18.63 14.20 2.12 39.89
Notes: Figures in the first column refer to horizons (i.e., number of years). All other figures are 
estimates rounded to two decimal places - rounding errors may prevent a perfect percentage 
decomposition in some cases. Several alternative orderings of these variables were also tried 
with monetary variables appearing prior to the output variable. Such alterations, however, did 
not alter the results to any substantial degree. This is possibly due to the variance-covariance 
matrix of residuals being near diagonal, arrived at through Choleksi decomposition in order to 
orthogonalize the innovations across equations. 
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FIGURE 3. (a). Impulse responses of real output, prices, exchange rate from a one-
standard deviation shock to M1. (b) Impulse responses of real output, 
prices, exchange rate from a one-standard deviation shock to M2
FIGURE 4. (a). Impulse responses to money (M1), prices, exchange rate and 
interest rate from a one-standard deviation shock to real output. (b). 
Impulse responses to money (M2), prices, exchange rate from 
a one-standard deviation shock to real output
(a)
(b)
(a)
(b)
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of capital controls in September 1998 was consistent with the objective of 
keeping ringgit pegged to US$. The question now is whether after six years 
the controls should still continue or not.
 The theoretical literature tends to suggest that there are a number of 
potential benefits from capital account liberalisation. Prasad, Rogof, Wei 
and Kose (2003) survey this literature and describe four direct benefits: the 
increase in domestic savings, a reduction in the cost of capital through better 
global allocation of risk, the transfer of technological and managerial know-
how, and the stimulation of domestic financial development. It also describes 
three indirect benefits: the promotion of specialisation, the commitment to 
better economic policies, and sending a signal of friendlier policies for 
foreign investment in the future. Capital account liberalisation, however, can 
also have important costs. For instance, by increasing market discipline and 
integration with global financial markets, removing controls can increase a 
country’s vulnerability to banking and currency crisis. As seen in the late 
1990’s, these crises can be severe and have substantial economic and social 
costs. The macroeconomic literature (Eichengreen 2002) has had limited 
empirical success in consistently showing that capital account liberalisation 
has any of these effects. The contrasting results of the two most cited studies 
reflect this inconsistency. Rodrik (1998) finds no significant relationship 
between capital account openness and growth, while Quinn (1997) applies a 
different measure of capital account openness and finds a significant positive 
relationship (Forbes 2004).
 On the macroeconomic impact of capital controls in Malaysia, Kaplan 
and Rodrik (2002) found that the capital controls had positive macroeconomic 
effects, while Dornbusch (2002) found they had no significant effect. Johnson 
and Mitton (2002), however, apply a very different microeconomic approach 
to analyse how the Asian crisis and the announcement of the capital controls 
affected the stock returns of individual Malaysian companies. Their findings 
tend to suggest that capital controls reduced market discipline and its cost 
was substantial. Forbes (2004) suggests that the accumulation of different 
costs of capital controls tends to indicate that they may act as “mud in the 
wheels of market discipline” and significantly depress productivity and growth. 
However, the benefits of capital account liberalisation may be smaller and 
the risk of severe crisis may be greater for countries with weak institutions 
and poor corporate governance.
 Finally, a very recent empirical work published last month by Goldman 
Sachs (co-authored by Teixeira, Masih, and O’Neill (2004)) based on the 
application of dynamic heterogeneous panel cointegration techniques for 20 
developed countries and 14 emerging countries tends to suggest that Australia 
(among the developed countries) and Malaysia (among the emerging countries) 
performed relatively best in terms of the effect of liberalisation of capital 
control on different economic and financial indicators (such as, real GDP 
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growth, real GDP per capita, FDI to GDP ratio, inflation, financial stability, 
real TWI,  FX volatility, equity returns, and short rates) (see Table 7).
 Most importantly, the lifting of controls on capital movement is likely to 
enhance the flow of FDI into Malaysia and increase the share of manufacturing 
in GNP. According to the annual reports of Bank Negara Malaysia, FDI 
constitutes about one-third of Malaysia’s private investment, and gross FDI as 
a percentage of GDP has declined since 1997. By sectors, FDI has significantly 
fallen in manufacturing (from 66% to 38%) and significantly risen in services 
(from 21% to 38%). In order to accelerate the growth rate of GNP, the greater 
the share of manufacturing in GNP and the longer Malaysia can stay with a 
high share of manufacturing (rather than that of service sector), the more is 
likely to be the growth rate of GNP in Malaysia. This is due to the fact that 
the benefits stemming from economies of scale and specialisation in capital- 
and technology- intensive as well as skill-intensive industries can be reaped 
much better in manufacturing (compared to the service sector). It is mainly 
for increasing the share of manufacturing in GNP that the UK government 
imposed a selective employment tax (SET) on the service sector in the 1960’s 
and 1970’s in line with the recommendations of Professor Nicholas Kaldor 
of Cambridge University.
 Having considered the arguments for and against liberalisation of capital 
controls (both theoretical and empirical), it appears to me that, on balance, 
the benefits of lifting capital controls in Malaysia will far outweigh the risks 
involved. 
SHOULD MALAYSIA CONTINUE (OR UNTIE) DOLLAR PEG?
Should Malaysia decide to continue her independent monetary policy to 
achieve the domestic policy objectives as well as lift the controls on capital 
movement, then Malaysia cannot continue the rigid ringgit-dollar peg regime 
(in line with ‘inconsistent’ trilemma). The arguments for and against fixed 
exchange rates are well known in the literature. Given Malaysia’s economic, 
institutional, and political strength, my balance of judgement is in favour of 
a managed effective exchange rate with the ringgit being linked to a basket 
of currencies (weighted by trade balance) along with a flexible wide band 
for reasons given below.
POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS
One possible alternative for Malaysia is to consider Australia’s policy on 
TA
B
L
E
 7
. 
C
ou
nt
ry
 r
an
ki
ng
s 
of
 b
es
t 
to
 w
or
st
 p
er
fo
rm
er
s 
in
 r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 c
ap
it
al
 c
on
tr
ol
 l
ib
er
al
iz
at
io
n
D
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
ry
 p
an
el
 
 
 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P 
 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P 
 
F
D
I 
to
 G
D
P 
 In
fl
at
io
n 
F
in
an
ci
al
  
R
ea
l 
T
W
I 
F
X
 V
ol
at
il
it
y 
E
qu
it
y 
 
S
ho
rt
 r
at
es
 
 
gr
ow
th
 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ra
ti
o 
 
st
ab
il
it
y 
 
 
re
tu
rn
s 
  
1 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
U
K
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
U
K
 
U
K
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
 
2 
F
ra
nc
e 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
 B
el
gi
um
 
It
al
y 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
Ja
pa
n 
F
ra
nc
e 
S
w
ed
en
 
 
3 
N
or
w
ay
 
F
ra
nc
e 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
A
us
tr
al
ia
 
F
in
la
nd
 
S
w
ed
en
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
 
4 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
A
us
tr
ia
 
S
w
ed
en
 
G
er
m
an
y 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
A
us
tr
ia
 
S
pa
in
 
It
al
y 
F
in
la
nd
 
 
5 
A
us
tr
ia
 
N
or
w
ay
 
A
us
tr
ia
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
S
pa
in
 
 
C
an
ad
a 
G
re
ec
e 
U
K
 
 
6 
U
S
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
F
ra
nc
e 
S
pa
in
 
S
w
ed
en
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
F
in
la
nd
 
Ja
pa
n 
Ja
pa
n 
 
7 
D
en
m
ar
k 
S
pa
in
 
S
pa
in
 
C
an
ad
a 
G
er
m
an
y 
G
re
ec
e 
U
K
 
B
el
gi
um
 
 
 
8 
S
pa
in
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
G
re
ec
e 
S
w
ed
en
 
C
an
ad
a 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
N
or
w
ay
 
N
or
w
ay
 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
9 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
U
S
 
B
el
gi
um
 
U
K
 
F
ra
nc
e 
S
pa
in
 
B
el
gi
um
 
S
w
ed
en
 
A
us
tr
ia
 
10
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
C
an
ad
a 
U
S
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
S
w
ed
en
 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
F
in
la
nd
 
G
er
m
an
y
 
11
 
F
in
la
nd
 
S
w
ed
en
 
U
K
 
It
al
y 
A
us
tr
ia
 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
C
an
ad
a 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g
 
12
 
S
w
ed
en
 
G
re
ec
e 
It
al
y 
F
in
la
nd
 
B
el
gi
um
 
G
er
m
an
y 
G
re
ec
e 
U
S
 
P
or
tu
ga
l
 
13
 
G
re
ec
e 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
U
S
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
U
S
 
F
ra
nc
e 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
S
pa
in
 
U
S
 
 
14
 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
F
in
la
nd
 
G
er
m
an
y 
A
us
tr
ia
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
C
an
ad
a 
A
us
tr
ia
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
F
ra
nc
e 
 
15
 G
er
m
an
y 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
N
or
w
ay
 
N
or
w
ay
 
F
in
la
nd
 
Ja
pa
n 
G
er
m
an
y 
A
us
tr
ia
 
B
el
gi
um
 
 
16
 
Ja
pa
n G
er
m
an
y 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
F
ra
nc
e 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
N
or
w
ay
 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
G
er
m
an
y 
N
or
w
ay
 
 
17
 
It
al
y C
an
ad
a 
F
in
la
nd
 
G
re
ec
e 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
U
S
 
It
al
y 
L
ux
em
bo
ur
g 
C
an
ad
a 
 
18
 
C
an
ad
a 
It
al
y 
 
 
Ja
pa
n 
B
el
gi
um
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
N
et
he
rl
an
ds
 
D
en
m
ar
k 
 
19
 
B
el
gi
um
 
Ja
pa
n 
 
 
N
or
w
ay
 
P
or
tu
ga
l 
F
ra
nc
e 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
S
pa
in
 
 
20
 
U
K
 
B
el
gi
um
 
 
 
G
re
ec
e 
S
w
it
ze
rl
an
d 
U
S
 
U
K
 
G
re
ec
e 
(c
on
ti
nu
ed
)
E
m
er
gi
ng
 m
ar
ke
t 
pa
ne
l 
 
 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P 
 
R
ea
l 
G
D
P 
 
F
D
I 
to
 G
D
P 
 In
fl
at
io
n 
F
in
an
ci
al
  
R
ea
l 
T
W
I 
F
X
 V
ol
at
il
it
y 
E
qu
it
y 
 
S
ho
rt
 r
at
es
 
 
gr
ow
th
 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
ra
ti
o 
 
st
ab
il
it
y 
 
 
re
tu
rn
s
  
1 
K
or
ea
 
K
or
ea
 
K
or
ea
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
B
ra
zi
l 
M
al
ay
si
a 
T
ur
ke
y 
M
ex
ic
o 
 
2 
M
al
ay
si
a 
M
al
ay
si
a 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
B
ra
zi
l 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
K
or
ea
 
K
or
ea
 
M
ex
ic
o 
B
ra
zi
l 
 
3 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
T
ur
ke
y 
M
al
ay
si
a 
C
hi
le
 
K
or
ea
 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
B
ra
zi
l 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
H
on
g 
K
on
g
 
4 
T
ur
ke
y 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
M
al
ay
si
a 
M
al
ay
si
a 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
M
al
ay
si
a 
In
di
a 
 
5 
In
di
a 
M
ex
ic
o 
T
ur
ke
y 
E
cu
ad
or
 
B
ra
zi
l 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
T
ur
ke
y 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
K
or
ea
 
 
6 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
In
di
a 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
di
a 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
B
ra
zi
l 
M
al
ay
si
a
 
7 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
M
al
ay
si
a 
E
cu
ad
or
 
In
di
a 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
T
ur
ke
y
 
8 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
B
ra
zi
l 
K
or
ea
 
T
ur
ke
y 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
C
hi
le
 
K
or
ea
 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a
 
9 
M
ex
ic
o 
B
ra
zi
l 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
di
a 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
M
ex
ic
o 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
E
cu
ad
or
 
C
hi
le
 
 
10
 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
M
ex
ic
o 
M
ex
ic
o 
C
hi
le
 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
11
 
B
ra
zi
l 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
C
hi
le
 
H
on
g 
K
on
g 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
T
ur
ke
y 
S
ou
th
 A
fr
ic
a 
In
di
a 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
12
 
E
cu
ad
or
 
C
hi
le
 
M
ex
ic
o 
P
hi
li
pp
in
es
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
M
ex
ic
o 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
13
 
C
hi
le
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
E
cu
ad
or
 
S
in
ga
po
re
 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
E
cu
ad
or
 
In
di
a 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
C
ol
um
bi
a
 
14
 
A
rg
en
ti
na
 
E
cu
ad
or
 
In
di
a 
T
ur
ke
y 
C
hi
le
 
C
ol
um
bi
a 
E
cu
ad
or
 
C
hi
le
 
E
cu
ad
or
 
N
ot
es
: 
T
he
 r
an
ki
ng
s 
ar
e 
ba
se
d 
on
 a
ve
ra
ge
 r
es
po
ns
e 
pa
th
s 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 c
ou
nt
ry
 a
cr
os
s 
ea
ch
 s
ho
ck
 d
er
iv
ed
 f
ro
m
 g
en
er
al
iz
ed
 i
m
pu
ls
e 
re
sp
on
se
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 
of
 m
od
el
s 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
ou
r 
ca
pi
ta
l 
co
nt
ro
l 
pr
ox
y 
in
de
x,
 a
lo
ng
 w
it
h 
va
ri
ou
s 
co
nt
ro
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
– 
fo
r 
de
ta
il
s 
of
 e
ac
h 
se
pa
ra
te
 s
pe
ci
fi
ca
ti
on
, 
se
e 
te
xt
. 
W
e 
as
se
ss
 t
he
 fi
rs
t 
8 
qu
ar
te
rs
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g 
th
e 
sh
oc
k.
 T
o 
de
ri
ve
 t
he
 g
en
er
al
iz
ed
 i
m
pu
ls
e 
re
sp
on
se
 f
un
ct
io
ns
 w
e 
us
ed
 e
it
he
r 
co
in
te
gr
at
ed
 V
A
R
S
 o
r 
V
E
C
 
m
od
el
s,
 o
r 
un
re
st
ri
ct
ed
 V
A
R
S
 i
n 
di
ff
er
en
ce
d 
fo
rm
. 
L
ag
 l
en
gt
h 
w
as
 d
et
er
m
in
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
S
ch
w
ar
z 
B
ay
es
ia
n 
C
ri
te
ri
a 
(S
B
C
) 
an
d 
pa
rt
ia
ll
y 
go
ve
rn
ed
 
by
 t
he
 l
en
gt
h 
of
 t
he
 s
am
pl
e 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 s
ys
te
m
 w
hi
ch
 v
ar
ie
d 
by
 s
pe
ci
fi
ca
ti
on
 a
s 
w
el
l 
as
 c
ou
nt
ry
. 
W
e 
us
ed
 a
 b
at
te
ry
 o
f 
di
ag
no
st
ic
s 
to
 e
va
lu
at
e 
m
od
el
 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
se
ri
al
 c
or
re
la
ti
on
 (
L
M
),
 h
et
er
os
ke
da
st
ic
it
y 
(L
M
),
 i
n 
an
d 
ou
t 
of
 s
am
pl
e 
st
ab
il
it
y 
(P
hi
ll
ip
s 
an
d 
Q
ur
it
os
, 
C
U
S
U
M
 o
f 
S
qu
ar
es
) 
an
d 
fu
nc
ti
on
al
 f
or
m
 (
R
am
se
y 
R
E
S
E
T
).
 S
ou
rc
e:
 G
ol
dm
an
 S
ac
hs
 e
st
im
at
es
.
TA
B
L
E
 7
 (
C
on
t.)
22 Jurnal Pengurusan 24
inflation targeting, that is, trying to keep underlying inflation between 2 and 
3 per cent on average, over the cycle. The flexible band and medium term 
of inflation targeting has helped Australia stabilize both inflation and output 
variation. However, a major prerequisite of inflation targeting is to have well-
developed and diversified financial systems that are able to minimize real sector 
disruptions due to transitory exchange rate variation. Most importantly the 
advanced countries are able to borrow overseas in their domestic currencies. 
Many developing countries are unable to do so leading to accumulation of 
foreign currency debt liabilities that are primarily dollar-denominated and 
unhedged.  In such countries, sharp depreciation in their currencies affects 
the domestic currency value of their debt with adverse real sector effects 
(so called “balance sheet” effects).
 A more realistic alternative is to peg the ringgit to a basket of currencies 
weighted by trade balance. Consistent with the trilemma, Malaysia can have 
a managed effective exchange rate with a flexible wide band (in order to 
allow both an independent monetary policy and free capital movement).
 Depegging the ringgit in the near future is likely to result in a slight 
appreciation of ringgit, but it is not likely to have any significant volatility 
in exchange rate because an appreciation of ringgit against US$ would:
 1. not increase the price of manufactured exports by the full amount of 
the likely appreciation (a) because of the lower costs of imported inputs used 
in the high import contents of manufactured exports (such as electronics, 
electrical and transport equipments and telecommunications) constituting about 
70% of total exports (Chandran, Pandiyan & Madhavan 2004), (b) because 
of the likely fall in unit labor cost (i.e., the cost of labor per unit of output) 
caused by the increase in the productivity of labor in technology-intensive 
and skill-intensive exports, and (c) reduce the CPI by reducing the cost of 
imported food;
 2. reduce the cost of external debt and debt servicing denominated in 
foreign currencies;
 3. enhance the flow of foreign capital (both portfolio and FDI) into 
Malaysia;
 4. ease the enormous burden now placed on fiscal policy. Given the 
peg, the exchange rate cannot be used as a policy instrument and hence as 
the capital controls are slowly eased, the room for monetary independence 
gets correspondingly diminished because more responsibility falls on the 
monetary policy to keep the exchange rate fixed by keeping the inflation 
rate differential and interest rate differential with the base country stable. 
No wonder, therefore, most of the burden of achieving the domestic policy 
objectives, such as higher growth and employment and income distribution, 
etc. has fallen disproportionately on the shoulder of fiscal policy resulting 
in a significant fiscal deficit in Malaysia for the last six consecutive years 
since 1998; and
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 5. reduce the sterilization costs of foreign reserves. Right now, as a 
percentage of GDP, Malaysia is bearing the highest sterilization debt service 
cost in the East Asian region (whereas China has the least cost of sterilization 
in the region) (Le Mesurier 2004).
THE TIMING OF DEPEGGING RINGGIT
I think the crucial issue in Malaysia is not whether Malaysia should or 
should not depeg the ringgit and lift capital controls but when. The timing 
of de-pegging is, of course, a matter of political judgement but it appears 
that Malaysia has the psychological “fear of floating” as long as the big 
partner (China) keeps her currency pegged to the US$. Despite, the fact that 
none of the major trade partners in East Asia, particularly the three worse 
hit countries in 1997 such as Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea have kept 
their currencies pegged with the US$.
 One should remember that the lesson from the 1997 financial crisis is 
not that the managed effective exchange rate system is inappropriate for the 
crisis countries but that these countries should not have given an excessive 
weight to the US dollar. The US dollar had the overwhelming weight “defacto”, 
whereas the Japanese yen had a weight of less than 0.1 in the average S.E 
Asian currency basket (although Japan was the region’s largest export market 
along with the US and the region’s dominant import source).  Japan was also 
the region’s largest creditor, and a substantial share of bank lending (debt 
flow) and external debt (stock) to the region was denominated in yen. It 
appears that the SE Asian countries made the mistake of rigidly pegging to 
the US dollar, rather than pegging more flexibly to a basket of currencies. 
A simple average of the various studies reveals the optimum weight of the 
Japanese yen to be on the range between 0.3 and 0.4, the remainder being 
divided between the US$, Euro and or regional currencies. This is far higher 
than the ‘de facto’ pre-crisis weight for Japanese of less than 0.1 (Rajan 
2002).
 It is very important to bear in mind that although a bad exchange rate 
regime may be damaging for a country, but a good exchange rate regime 
alone cannot be successful, unless the exchange rate regime is supported by 
other policy arms of the government.The broad lessons from all the crises 
that happened in the recent past, say for example, the crisis in Mexico 
(1994), in East Asia (1997), and more recently in Argentina (2002), is that 
the exchange rate was not supported fully by other policy weapons of the 
government in particular, the monetary and fiscal policies. 
 As to the timing of depegging and lifting of controls, it appears to me 
that the longer the Malaysian government delays in taking decision to de-
peg and decontrol, the more is likely to be the loss in terms of the potential 
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growth in FDI and GDP, and the more is likely to be the volatility when 
the government is forced to depeg. Right now Malaysia is giving a wrong 
psychological signal to the world about the strength of her economy. The 
rest of the world is wondering as to the fact that if the economic health of 
Malaysia is genuinely strong, then why is ringgit still pegged to a drastically 
depreciating US dollar, and why does not Malaysia have the courage and 
confidence to lift controls on capital movement and transmit the right signal 
to the rest of the world.
 If Malaysia is in fact waiting for China to depeg, is Malaysia so much 
afraid that she wants to be the last country in East Asia to depeg, despite 
the fact that all other crisis-affected East Asian countries had the courage 
to depeg with the US dollar and did not wait for China to dictate them. 
Indonesia and Thailand are doing far better in terms of growth than Malaysia 
although they have weaker economic fundamentals and political environments. 
Despite the increased flow of FDI into Malaysia in recent years, a lot of FDI 
investors who are really interested in coming over to Malaysia are being 
prevented from entering Malaysia because all other neighboring East Asian 
countries (excepting Malaysia and China) are giving them the freedom of 
capital movement (in and out). These potential FDI investors are afraid to 
come into Malaysia because of the capital controls imposed on them. The 
case of China is quite different. China is getting a high rate of FDI despite 
capital controls as China is now one of the largest markets in the world and 
they cannot afford to relax capital controls because unlike Malaysia, their 
financial and corporate systems are relatively much weaker.
 China should be considered as an opportunity (rather than as a threat). 
Malaysia cannot compete with China or India or Indonesia in labor-intensive 
industries. The future of Malaysia lies in moving towards technology-intensive 
and skill-intensive industries (Annual Reports, Bank Negara Malaysia and 
Economic Reports, Ministry of Finance Malaysia). The technology-intensive 
and skill-intensive industries can be classified into ‘low’, ‘medium’, and 
‘high’. In line with the ‘product cycle theory’, if Malaysia moves towards 
‘medium’ technology-intensive and ‘medium’ skill-intensive industries, there 
will be less competition with China’s relatively lower technology-intensive 
and lower skill-intensive industries.
CONCLUSION
In an increasingly globalized world, the investment psychology plays a very 
important role in causing volatility. In order to reduce the possible volatility, 
a major policy change should take place when the speculators least expect 
that change. Now is the time therefore, to ride the boat across the sea when 
the economic sea appears to be relatively calm and quiet and there is no 
Macroeconomic Policy Trilemma in Open Economies 25
possible economic or political storm on the horizon. Volatility is likely to be 
more if the speculators can predict the timing of the possible regime change. 
Since any economic reform usually takes a while to bear the desired fruits, 
politically it is always advisable, on the basis of the experience of many 
democracies of the world, that the sooner the change takes place just after a 
very successful (recent) election, the longer the time will be available for the 
Malaysian government to face the next election with the fruits of the regime 
change. The longer the delay in taking the decision on a regime change, the 
more is the chance that some factors either domestic or international will 
suddenly get worse and more sharp is likely to be the volatility when the 
government is finally forced to have a regime change. Given the current 
relatively good economic health, the sooner the exchange rate changes along 
with a freer capital movement to reflect that health, the quicker the doubts 
and misgivings of the rest of the world about the genuine strength of the 
Malaysian economy will be over.
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